Cyber Institutions & Sub-optimal Logic of Cyber Deterrence
Oct 2, 2019, 12:30 – 1:30pm EDT
Can states make cyber deterrence work? Empirical research on cyber deterrence has told us relatively little about the deterrence ability of cyber institutions — publicly observable efforts aimed at signaling a country’s level of cyber offensive capability and doctrine behind its use. Doctoral Fellow Nadiya Kostyuk will demonstrate that cyber institutions deter adversaries only in limited cases and, despite this, states tend to sub-optimally over-invest resources in these institutions.
Campus: Medford/Somerville Campus City: Medford, MA 02155 Building: Cabot Intercultural Center Campus: Medford/Somerville Campus Location Details: 205 Cabot Event Type: Lectures & Seminars Event sponsor (school, institute, center, etc.): School of Engineering, The Fletcher School Event Contact: Josh Anderson Event Sponsor: Cyber Security & Public Policy Program RSVP Information: N/A Admission: Free Open to Public: Yes More info: sites.tufts.edu…